


Below, we critically evaluate the evidence concerning the descriptive and constitutive features of crossmodal correspondences and synesthesia and highlight how they differ. To conflate these two phenomena is both inappropriate and potentially misleading.

We believe that crossmodal correspondences should be studied in their own right and not assimilated, either in terms of the name used or in terms of the explanation given, to synesthesia. Here, though, we defend the separatist view, arguing that these cases are likely to form distinct kinds of phenomena despite their superficial similarities. Over the intervening years, many other researchers have agreed-at the very least, implicitly-with this position (e.g., Bien, ten Oever, Goebel, & Sack NeuroImage 59:663–672, 2012 Eagleman Cortex 45:1266–1277, 2009 Esterman, Verstynen, Ivry, & Robertson Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18:1570–1576, 2006 Ludwig, Adachi, & Matzuzawa Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108:20661–20665, 2011 Mulvenna & Walsh Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10:350–352, 2006 Sagiv & Ward 2006 Zellner, McGarry, Mattern-McClory, & Abreu Chemical Senses 33:211–222: 2008). A little over a decade ago, Martino and Marks (Current Directions in Psychological Science 10:61–65, 2001) put forward the influential claim that cases of intuitive matchings between stimuli in different sensory modalities should be considered as a weak form of synesthesia.
